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research on interreligious relations and conversions in interwar Slovenia. He is a Fulbright
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pluralism. His research interests include the history of religions, such as the transnational and
political history of interwar Slovenia and Yugoslavia. Science and Research Centre Koper,
Slovenia, gasper.mithans@zrs-kp.si
Abstract
With the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the respective
nationalities and ethnic communities were faced with the reality of a multi-confessional state.
Internal migration and minority policy, in particular, set in motion a slow diversification in
the religious sphere, even in the ethnically and religiously extremely homogeneous territory
of Slovenia. This paper aims to analyze the role that religious converts—who were largely
former Catholics—played during the interwar period in Slovenian regions in the phenomenon
of the gradual transformation of the religious landscape over a long period of time. Converts
were an important part of almost all religious minorities: including in “traditional” religious
communities, such as the German Evangelicals (i.e., Lutherans of German nationality), as
much as in religious communities that were new to this region, such as the Serbian Orthodox
Church, the Old Catholic Church, and the Islamic religious community, and even in small
communities, including the Baptists, the Nazarenes, and others. Religious conversions, above
all, marked the contemporary and historical relationships among the various religious
communities in Slovenian territory, and, in a broader framework, among Yugoslav
nationalities—and often given the ethnic character of these religious communities, even
cross-national and interethnic relations. Despite their conflictual hypostasis, it can be argued
that these changes in relationships constituted the basis for further secularization, greater

1

The author acknowledges that the research program (Slovenia and the Mediterranean, P6-0272) and the
research project (Interreligious Dialogue–a Basis for Coexisting Diversity in the Light of Migration and the
Refugee Crisis, J6-9393) in the scope of which this publication was published, have been financially supported
by the Slovenian Research Agency.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2020) XL, 2

48

heterogeneity among the congregation of the majority Catholic Church, and germs of
religious plurality.
Keywords: religious communities, conversions, interwar Slovenia, Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, history of religions.

Introduction
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (hereafter, the Kingdom of SHS; in
1929 renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was a multi-national and multi-confessional state
with varied historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. The history of religions in
Yugoslavia is often viewed through the perspective of interethnic conflict, but interreligious
relations were (and still are) all the more complex because there was not a nationality or
religion with an absolute majority. Yugoslavia was the only European country with a large
Orthodox (46.6 percent) as well as Catholic (39.4 percent), and Islamic religious
communities (11.2 percent of the population).2 The Serbian Orthodox Church had by far the
greatest influence, particularly in politics, public administration, and the military. The ruling
Karadjordjević dynasty was also a member of this religious institution, which had, de jure,
lost its status of state church. Each of these religious traditions had their own interpretation of
not only the role of religion in society and politics, but also of interreligious and interethnic
cohabitation. The latter was very specific precisely in former Yugoslavia, where Croats,
Serbs and Bosniaks shared a series of related characteristics, especially the language, while
their ethnicities as their strongest identifiers, were based on religious and historical
differences; i.e., the constructed ethnoreligious identity.3 Precisely the representation of
religious conversion, from conversions into Islam primarily in the 15th and 16th centuries to
forced conversions of Serbian Orthodox to the Catholic Church in the Independent State of

According to the 1921 Census; see Milivoja Šircelj, Verska, jezikovna in narodna sestava prebivalstva
Slovenije: popisi 1921-2002 [Religious, linguistic and national composition of population of Slovenia: 19212002 censuses]. (Ljubljana: Statistični urad Republike Slovenije, 2003), p. 68.
3
Cf. Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), pp. 63-64; Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan idols: religion and nationalism in
Yugoslav states (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. vii; Ivo Banac, The National Question
in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).
2
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Croatia, are at the core of national myths that are still being discussed, even by national
historiographies.4
During the interwar period, the issue about conversion and the related proselytizing in
the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia was a delicate topic. In the first decade, the Slovenes and
the Croats gained, for the first time, a partial acknowledgment as modern ‘nations’ through
the inclusion of their names in the name of the state, the use of their languages in the state
administration, intense cultural development, etc. But at the same time, in this multinational
complex they were confronted with increasing Serbian centralism and Yugoslav unitarism,
which, by attempting to weaken national and ethnic identities, particularly after the
introduction of the royal dictatorship in 1929, also interfered with religious matters; for
example, by banning political parties and societies of “tribal” (i.e., ethnic) and religious
nature. This was markedly reflected in the relations between the historical rivals, the Catholic
Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the affiliation to either of which carried a strong
national and political connotation.
The area of interreligious relations was unregulated and most importantly, not unified
from a legal point of view throughout the existence of the first Yugoslavia. Old laws were in
force, which were regionally specific, even among Catholic Church members alone. For
example, in the area of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia. which had been administratively
part of Cisleithania prior to the First World War—i.e., today’s Slovenia and western parts of
Croatia5—the issue of interreligious relations after the cancellation of the Austrian concordat
was primarily regulated by the Act on Interconfessional Relations of 25 May 1868. The only
nationwide act also regulating the religious sphere was the constitution. Religious equality for
members of accepted and recognized denominations was enshrined in the Vidovdan (1921)
and the Octroi (1931) constitutions, which, however, does not mean that it was consistently
guaranteed. The dominant majority religions were able to preserve their monopoly at the
regional levels, with some temporary restrictions on their influence on politics. The accepted
Cf. Bojan Aleksov, “Adamant and Treacherous: Serbian Historians on Religious Conversions”, in Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 26, 2006, 1, pp. 23-52. Dubravko Lovrenović, “Kroatizacija bosanskog
srednjovjekovlja u svjetlu interkonfesionalnosti stećaka (O jednom modelu promjene historijskog pamćenja)
[Croatization of Bosnian Middle Ages in the Light of Interconfessional Tombstones (On One Model of
Changing Historical Memory)],” in Godišnjak/Jahrbuch [Yearbook], 42, 2013, pp. 103, 109, 122-125; Caner
Sancaktar, “Historical Construction and Development of Bosniak Nation,” in Alternatives: Turkish Journal of
International Relations, 11, 2016, 1: 1-2.
5
With the exception of those parts of the western Slovenian and Croatian ethnic territories which were
incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy following the Treaty of Rapallo (1920). Most of that territory was
incorporated into Yugoslavia after the Second World War and the brief existence of the Free Territory of
Trieste. It was not until the Treaty of Osimo in 1975–1977 that the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was
officially demarcated.
4
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denominations, those which had gained legal recognition in all parts of the kingdom, were the
Orthodox, Catholic (of Roman, Greek and Armenian rites), Evangelical (Lutherans and
Reformed Church), Jewish, and Muslim faiths, whereas the recognized religions included the
Old Catholic, Mennonite, and Baptist churches. In 1923, by decree of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, the Old Catholic and Baptist churches were also included among accepted
denominations.6 There were several attempts to pass an interconfessional law, but this
prompted immediate opposition in the Catholic circles in Slovenia and Croatia, mainly due to
the issues of interfaith marriage, religious affiliation and the upbringing of children born from
interfaith marriages, and conversion. Later, other drafts of interconfessional law were
submitted (in 1925, 1931 and 1940), but all failed to be passed during the period of the
Kingdom,7 in part because the Catholic Church insisted that a concordat should be adopted
first. The agreement between Yugoslavia and the Holy See also addressed some issues from
the sphere of interreligious relations, particularly the regulation of interfaith marriage, as well
as the demand for institutions and property of the Catholic Church to remain in the
possession of the church in the event of the population served by them converting to other
faiths. Due to the opposition from the Serbian Orthodox Church and political opposition
parties, the concordat was never ratified.8
Differences between “Yugoslav” nationalities were also evident in relation to the
predominant type of the so-called collectivist religions9 or perception of religious affiliation
as “a given” (as opposed to religious identity as “a choice”). In this paper, I aim to show the
role that representations of religion play in historical processes which have the power to
strengthen or weaken religious identity at collective and individual levels, and how the latter,
despite frequent perceptions to the contrary on the part of believers, is always subject to
change. Relations between religious communities and state authorities can greatly influence
that—for example, by politicizing religion, marginalizing or privileging certain religious
communities—as can relations between religious communities themselves. A particular
example is the relative openness to religious conversions—specifically, to joining a religion,

Juraj Kolarić, Ekumenska trilogija: istočni kršćani: pravoslavni: protestanti [Ecumenical trilogy: Eastern
Christians: Orthodox: Protestants] (Zagreb: Prometej, 2005), pp. 889-890.
7
Gašper Mithans, Jugoslovanski konkordat: pacem in discordia ali jugoslovanski “kulturkampf” [Yugoslav
concordat: pacem in discordia or Yugoslav “culture war”] (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2017), pp.
81–86, 102–103.
8
Ibid., pp. 188–203, 335–337.
9
Slavica Jakelić, Collectivistic Religions: Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity (Farnham;
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), p. 45.
6

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2020) XL, 2

51

not to disaffiliating from one—which will be presented through different types of voluntary
conversions in the Slovenian part of the Kingdom of SHS.10
I also intend to problematize Slavica Jakelić’s thesis that unlike other nationalities of
former Yugoslavia, the Slovenes cultivated an individualistic type of religion due to the
absence of a strong “religious Other” (the majority religion in all neighboring countries is
Catholic), the controversial role of the Catholic Church during the Second World War, and,
compared to other nationalities of former Yugoslavia, due to the smaller role of the dominant
religious institution in society or less importance of religion for the identity of the Slovenes.11
At the same time, I will verify the weight of this argument, which is based on developments
after 1941 and, particularly, following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in the context of a
significantly less “secularized” interwar period, the time of (the attempt of) the so-called first
re-Catholicization or comprehensive social renewal according to the Catholic model in recent
history.12 The period under study was thus, on the one hand, taken as “a model” by most
parties of the right-wing political spectrum after Slovenia’s independence in 1991 and, on the
other, it was the time of the first beginnings of religious diversification and modernization of
society.13

Theoretical Framework
Most terminology in humanities, social sciences, and study of religions in particular is
grounded on Western Christian scholarly tradition and thus biased.14 As Meredith McGuire
lucidly observes, Western scholars’ concepts of religion and religious commitment were
developed based on [Western] European [Christian-centered] experience of religious
contexts. Therefore, established conceptual apparatus has not succeeded to appropriately
address the notion of religious membership and individual religious practice built on mutually

Despite its partial anachronism, I will occasionally use the term “Slovenia” for the geographical area of the
northern part of the Kingdom of SHS, called Drava Banovina between 1929 and 1941, which was mostly
inhabited by Slovene-speaking population. Although Slovenia as an autonomous administrative unit in the
Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia did not exist, the term “Slovenia” was often used to refer to this territory, even in
official documents.
11
Jakelić, 2010, p. 49; cf. Maca Jogan, Katoliška cerkev in družbeno zlo [Catholic Church and the Social Evil]
(Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2016), pp. 23–24.
12
Jogan, 2016, pp. 13-15.
13
Cf. Jogan, 2016, pp. 25-26.
14
Cf. James A. Kapaló, Text, Context and Performance: Gagauz Folk Religion in Discourse and Practice
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 26-27; Victor Roudometof, “Orthodox Christianity and the State: the Relevance of
Globalization,” in Review of Ecumenical Studies, 10, 2018, 2: 213.
10
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exclusive categories, neither how individuals engage in their religions in their everyday
lives.15
In this regard, I will specify the approach and outline some theoretical considerations
that I consider appropriate to be applied to this and similar researches on religion through the
lens of the phenomenon of religious conversion. However, I will not go into an in-depth
analysis of conversion narratives as is often the case. Moreover, the emphasis will be more on
methodology that will include institutional spaces relevant for the research in a particular
religious field in Europe dominated by the Catholic Church, comparable with East Central
and South Eastern Europe, and beyond. This coincides with the recent trend in the study of
lived religion that emphasizes the importance of lived religion to focus on “the macro
(sociocultural) and micro (individual or private) levels of lived realities and lives of actors in
concrete situations.”16 This practice-based approach to religious phenomena has already been
adopted in some interdisciplinary historical studies,17 but in Southeastern Europe, it remains
relatively unexplored.
The more recent trends in researching the phenomenon of religious conversion in
history and anthropology emphasize the ambiguity, hybridity, and internal tensions within
religious and other social identities.18 Before, historians would focus on religious
syncretism19 and the authenticity of faith practices,20 while anthropology and other social
sciences, relying on Max Weber, polarized religion between “traditional” and
“rationalized.”21 The researchers who distanced themselves from these debates described
conversion as a cultural passage in search of human affiliation,22 as a step to achieving elite

15

Margaret B. McGuire, Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), pp. 24-25.
16
Srdjan Sremac et al. “Lived Religion and Lived (In)Tolerance,” in Lived Religion and the Politics of
(In)Tolerance, ed. Ruard R. Ganzevoort, Srdjan Sremac (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 4-5.
17
Kapaló, 2011, p. 32; Ellen Badone, “Introduction,” in Religious Orthodoxy and Popular Faith in European
Society, ed. Ellen Badone (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 6.
18
The Anthropology of Religious Conversion, ed. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Heather J. Sharkey, Cultural Conversions: Unexpected Consequences
of Christian Missionary Encounters in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2013); Shanta Premawardhana, Religious Conversion: Religion Scholars Thinking Together (New York:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).
19
Cf. Beyond Conversion and Syncretism. Indigenous Encounters with Missionary Christianity, 1800-2000, ed.
Lindenfeld, David and Miles Richardson (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011).
20
Cf. Carole M. Cusack, “Towards a General Theory of Conversion,” in Religious Change, Conversion and
Culture, ed. Lynette Olson (Sydney: Sydney Studies in Society and Culture, 1996), pp. 4-5.
21
Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993); Robin Horton, “African Conversion,” in Africa, 41, 1971, 2; John and
Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
22
Diane Austin-Bross, “The Anthropology of Conversion: Introduction,” in The Anthropology of Religious
Conversion, ed. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003),
pp. 1-14.
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status,23 or as a clear political statement against state-constructed identities.24 According to
Lewis Rambo, religious conversion means turning from and to new religious groups, ways of
life, systems of belief, and modes or relating to a deity or the nature of reality. 25 It is thus a
process of change that takes place in a dynamic field of persons, events, ideologies, and
institutions.26 Contemporary studies also support the idea that conversion does not happen in
a vacuum, but in relation to the social and cultural contexts in which converts are situated.27
I understand religious conversion as a “passage” through levels, types, and phases of
religious participation.28 Despite the struggle of a convert to be accepted by other believers as
a “full” member of the new religion, he/she will very likely be permanently labelled as a
“convert.” It is therefore salient for better understanding of a particular religious field to
discuss the autonomy of converts’ actions during the process of conversion—before and after
the “formal acceptance.” The agency of the converts should be analyzed in regard to their
impact

on

re-evaluation,

re-instatement,

and

re-negotiation

of

everyday

and

formal/institutionalized religious practices, expressions and meanings.29
As I mentioned earlier, changes of religious affiliation and/or worldview will be
studied as a process influenced by several personal and sociocultural factors. We can
distinguish between voluntary and forced, individual and collective conversions, but for the
purpose of this contribution, the following typology of religious change based on a
combination of different motives and reasons (i.e., push and pull factors)30 for conversion and
related phenomena adapted to the Yugoslav circumstances will be used:
- conversions of convenience (e.g., intermarriage, legalization of children born out of
wedlock, political and professional opportunism, seeking protection, a political statement
etc.);
David N. Gellner, “The Emergence of Conversion in a Hindu-Buddhist Polytropy: The Kathmandu Valley,
Nepal, c. 1600–1995,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 47, 2005, 4: 755-780.
24
Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
25
Lewis R. Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 2-3.
26
Peter Halama, “Empirical Approach to Typology of Religious Conversion,” in Pastoral Psychology, 64, 2015,
2: 185–186.
27
Elysia Guzik, “The Search for Meaning: Information Seeking and Religious Conversion,” in Advances in the
Study of Information and Religion, 3, 2013, 5: 15.
28
Cf. Henri Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 4-5.
29
Cf. James A. Kapaló, “Mediating Orthodoxy: Convert agency and discursive autochthonism in Ireland,” in
Orthodox Identities in Western Europe: Migration, Settlement and Innovation, ed. Maria Hämmerli and JeanFrançois Mayer (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 239–240; Yafa Shanneik, “Conversion and Religious Habitus:
The Experiences of Irish Women Converts to Islam in the Pre-Celtic Tiger Era,” in Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, 31, 2011, 4: 505.
30
To further elaborate on definitions of religious conversion see: Ines W. Jindra, A New Model of Religious
Conversion: Beyond Network Theory and Social Constructivism (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014).
23
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- forced conversions;
- deconversion (a person leaves and remains without religion);
- reconversion (as religious revival or return to original faith);
- conversions of ‘committed’ converts (converts are active in religious rites and social
activities of the religious community they were recently accepted in).
The conversions I will focus on will mostly include those concerning state
“recognized” religions not because I would consider them more relevant—although vastly
prevalent in number and influence—but for the sake of the limits of presented research. Still,
some of the insights may be pertinent also in the contexts of other denominations. Studying
converts that cross the “hard” structures of religious institutions, the religious border that is
more open for “incomers,” while to leave the community is much less acceptable and
stigmatized, offers an insight into individuals’ agency and permeability of the boundaries of
these institutions that represent themselves as “fixed,” “solid,” and “unchanging.”
What definitions of religious conversions still often overlook, ignore, or underrate are
conversions of convenience, which have primarily secular motives (i.e., are not religiously
motivated—but do not exclude the possibility that a person becomes religious afterwards).
Very specific in this case was interwar Yugoslavia, and especially its northern part—Slovenia
or the Drava Banovina as it was called in the 1930s—due to several contradicting civil and
confessional legal systems in Yugoslavia.
Another point that needs to be emphasized is that recent “committed” converts mostly
do not seek to change their cultural identity, as the faith is a primary motivator, not just one
of the elements that form a religious identity. This profoundly changes the perception of
religious conversions, considered almost exclusively up until the 20th century as a form of
“acculturation” to the dominant power.31 However, proselytizing religious organizations are
by no means “equal” in their position, capital, and power. In fact, John Witte designates the
problem of proselytizing as “one of the great ironies of the democratic revolution of the
modern world,”32 while Johan van der Vyver describes the right to engage in missionary
activity as “perhaps the most controversial component of religious freedom.”33

Nadia Marzouki, “Introduction,” in Religious Conversions in the Mediterranean World, ed. Nadia Marzouki
and Olivier Roy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 3.
32
John Witte, “Soul Wars: New Battles, New Norms,” in The Review of Faith and International Affairs, 5,
2007, 1: 13; Proselytization Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets and Culture Wars, ed. Rosalind J. Hackett,
(London: Equinox, 2008).
33
Johan van der Vyver, “Religious Freedom in African Constitutions,” in Proselytization and Communal SelfDetermination in Africa, ed. Abdullahi A. An-Na'im (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), p. 128.
31
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Mythologization of Religious Past and Rudiments of Religious Diversification in the
Interwar Period in Slovenian Territory and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1941)
Two constants marking the first Yugoslavia were Serbian political centralism, often
disguised as Yugoslav unitarism, and Croatian-Serbian conflicts resulting from past and everemerging disagreements, exacerbated by government policy. The most pressing issue was the
national question, a chapter that the government establishment addressed too late with the
Cvetković-Maček Agreement (1939)—i.e., the foundation of the Croatian Banovina—only
managing to resolve it with the Croatians, and even in that case, unsatisfactorily. According
to Sabrina Ramet, the Kingdom in the first decade of its existence functioned as a nonconsensual, quasi-parliamentary system (1918–1929), then as a royal dictatorship (1929–
1934), then for a short period assumed the form of police state under the rule of the Yugoslav
Radical Community (1934–1939), and ended its existence as a Serbo-Croatian condominium
(1939–1941) surrendering to the occupying forces.34
As Radmila Radić points out, the three major religious communities were unable to
establish genuine cooperation throughout the 70-year period of the two Yugoslavias.35 This is
probably best reflected in the case of the unsuccessfully handled Yugoslav concordat. The
government of that time succeeded in persuading the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the
political representative of the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to interfere
in the discussion about the concordat and to have their delegates and senators support it in
exchange for a new constitution of the Islamic religious community (1936). Nothing of the
kind could be achieved with the Serbian Orthodox Church, although before leaving for
Rome, where on 25 July 1935 they signed the concordat, the government, contrary to any
established diplomatic practice, had even asked the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church
for “consent.” The patriarch soon changed his favorable opinion and the Serbian Orthodox
Church became one of the strongest opponents of the adoption of the concordat.36
The decision of the government not to subject to ratification the agreement that would
regulate the legal position of the Catholic Church and equalize its rights with those enjoyed
(exclusively) by the Serbian Orthodox Church, or more specifically, the role that the Serbian
Sabrina P. Ramet, “Vladko Maček and the Croatian Peasant Defence in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” in
Contemporary European History, 16, 2007, 2: 215–231.
35
Radmila Radić, “Religion in the multinational state: the case study of Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavism: Histories
of a Failed idea, 1918-1922, ed. Dejan Djokić (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), p. 196
36
Igor Salmič, Al di là di ogni pregiudizio: le trattative per il concordato tra la Santa Sede e il Regno dei Serbi,
Croati e Sloveni/Jugoslavia e la mancata ratifica (1922–1938) [Beyond all prejudice: concordat negotiations
between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia and the failure of ratification]
(Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2015), pp. 571-577; Mithans, 2017, pp. 188–203,
335–337.
34
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Orthodox Church played in the protests against the concordat,37 is believed to have
influenced the attitude of the authorities in the Independent State of Croatia and of some high
representatives of the Croatian Catholic Church towards the Serbian Orthodox during the
Second World War, including forced conversion to the Catholic faith. The number of these
forced conversions is estimated at around 100,000.38 The developments in ecclesiastical
circles were perhaps even more directly a response to the spreading of Serbian Orthodoxy,
and to a lesser extent, the Old Catholic faith throughout the country. It is estimated that
during the first Yugoslavia, as many as 200,000 people, mostly in Croatia, converted to
Orthodoxy; but this is, including in the opinion of Tomasevich, probably an exaggerated
calculation.39 Whatever the case may be, the idea in both state-supported instances was to try
to use religion conversion as a lever for national assimilation in the belief that the only
distinction between a Croat from a Serb was their faith, and that an Orthodox would make a
more patriotic Yugoslav than a Pope-guided Catholic.
These ethno-religious identifications, as well as national myths about Croats and
Serbs, have a much longer history. The myth about the protectors of “Christian” Europe,
antemurale christianitatis [Bulwark of Christendom], among others, is present in both
nationalities. Paul Mojzes points out four myths present in the memory of “Balkan groups:”
the myth of land and blood (the land inhabited by the ethnic group is sacred, all foreign rulers
are evil, and foreigners are accountable for every present day evil), the crucifixion and
resurrection syndrome (turning defeat into victory), time is understood mythologically rather
than chronologically (concepts of the past and the present are so intermixed that a grievance
of long ago is perceived as a present affliction; while it is believed that a present action may
not only vindicate but actually eradicate and reverse a past defeat), and the glorification of
war and violence as the best way to keep or reclaim one’s freedom.40 And emerging as
neuralgic points of these national myths were, even prior to the First World War, the very
religious conversions, beginning with the Christianization of “pagans,” followed by the
Islamization in the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Middle and early Modern

37

Ibid.
Filip Škiljan, Organizirana prisilna iseljavanja Srba iz NDH [Organized forced evictions of Serbs from the
Independent State of Croatia] (Zagreb: Srpsko narodno vijeće, 2014), p. 107; cf. Jozo Tomasevich, Rat i
revolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941 -1945: Okupacija i kolaboracija [War and revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945:
Occupation and collaboration] (Zagreb: Europapress holding, Novi Liber, 2010), p. 599.
39
Tomasevich, 2010, p. 599.
40
Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum Publishing
Company, 1994), pp. 39-41.
38
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Ages, and by conversions of the Orthodox to Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches
after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Monarchy.
Although we would have difficulties to find any of these myths among the
Slovenians, all ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia cultivate the myth of a deep, inseparable
connection between a nationality and the prevailing religion and religious institution, as well
as their autochthony in that nationality.41 Overall, in terms of the religious field, Slovenia
exhibits the characteristics of an overwhelming Catholic society, a society that for centuries
has been dominated by the Catholic Church, similar to Lithuania, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Poland or Croatia.42 The main features of predominantly Catholic society is “the
marginal position of other religions, and the fact that the statistical dominance of the Catholic
Church masks a wide variety in the attitudes toward Catholicism and modes of belonging to
the Catholic Church throughout the population, as well as substantial differences within the
Church itself.”43 In other words, if one distinguishes between American, British,
Scandinavian-Lutheran, mixed i.e., dual, Christian Orthodox and Latin (Catholic) religiocultural patterns, then historically Slovenians clearly belong to the latter.44
The case of Slovenia is, nevertheless, specific, for the Catholic Church played an
ambivalent role in shaping the Slovenian national group: from radical counter-Reformation,
which sought to nullify the attainments of Protestantism (modern standard language, first
translation of the Bible into Slovene (in 1577 the New Testament was translated, in 1584 the
whole Bible, etc.) and collaboration with the occupying forces during the Second World War,
on the one hand, to resistance to denationalizing during the 19th and early 20th centuries,
participation of certain Catholic circles in the Resistance during the Second World War and
the role of opposition in the socialist system, on the other.45 It should also be noted that
during the socialist regime in Yugoslavia, the repression of religious institutions, “generators
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42
See: Ingo W. Schröder, Vita Petrušauskaitė, “Pluralism of Traditions in a Catholic Majority Society. Catholic
Hegemony vis-à-vis Nationalism and Ethnic Experience,” in Etniškumo studijos/Ethnicity Studies, 11, 2013: 70.
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of cross-national conflicts” in the eyes of the authorities, relented significantly after 1953.46
The restriction of religion to the individual’s private sphere and the discrimination against
believers decreased in the belief of the Communist Party—i.e., League of Communists—that
religion or the need for religiosity among people would eventually fade away.47 In reality, the
“secularization trend” characteristic of Slovenia particularly during the 1960s and 1970s,
halted during the 1980s in harmony with Western Europe. In the early 1990s, religiousness
was on the rise again, while the second half of this decade already showed the first signs of
revival of the “secularization” trend.48
Although important, the Catholic faith or Christian faith in general was not a major
factor in the Slovenian national development, but that did not discourage attempts at
renewing the myth about Catholic Slovenia49 in the sense of “Only a Catholic Slovenian is a
true Slovenian” after the country’s independence. This exclusivist slogan was advocated in
Slovenian territories by the principal ideologue of the Slovenian political Catholicism and
originator of the political schism between pro-clerical Catholics and anti-clerical liberals (the
so-called division of spirits), Anton Mahnič, as early as the late 19th century.50
However, according to Marjan Smrke, contemporary Slovenian society seems to be
“more resistant to the (social) re-catholicizing pressures” than other predominantly Catholic,
post-socialist societies because of the liberal nature of Slovenian socialism, the (negative)
role of the Catholic Church during the Second World War, and the “remarkable
heterogeneity” of those who identify as members of the Catholic Church. The private
character of Catholicism makes the Slovenian case very different from the rest of the former
Yugoslav states and similar to Western and Central Europe. If Slovenia is similar to Western
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European societies in terms of its religious culture, it also suffers from the same problems in
dealing with religious pluralism.51 Slavica Jakelić stated the following:
the failure of connecting Catholicism, the Slovenian language, and national identity
also occurred because Slovenian Catholic clergy could not appeal to their own
historical traditions or narratives about Catholicism as constitutive of Slovenian
collective identity. The narratives about Catholicism that they would appropriate and
to which they would appeal, with an explicit acknowledgment, were the linguistic and
cultural legacies of their religious Others, the Protestant Reformers.52
The private character of Catholicism in Slovenia and the heterogeneity of the
members of the Catholic Church were crucially influenced by the period of socialism, but the
national schism during the Second World War, which for the first time significantly impaired
the reputation and power of the Catholic Church, has roots in the pre-war period and in the
increasing religious diversity. What separates the Slovenian territories from much of the
former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe as well, is the experience of the Enlightenment and
cultural struggle between the liberal and Catholic camps, which in the Austrian part of the
Habsburg Monarchy led to the establishment of a space for spreading secular ideas and to a
gradual limitation of the influence of religious communities in state structures through the
reform of relations between State and Catholic Church.
Carrying considerable weight in the discussion on religious specificities of Slovenia is
the thesis by Janko Pleterski that the most realistic portrayal of the balance of power in the
Slovenian political field during the interwar period is provided by the elections results of
1920. At that time, the “Catholic” Slovene People’s Party (hereafter, SLS) “only” received
36.1 percent of votes, while in other elections in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia and even
before the First World War, it would regularly win an absolute majority. About one-third of
the votes that year went to liberal parties and another third to the socialist camp. This result is
quite comparable with the first elections in the Republic of Austria and in other central
European countries. However, while many historians have presented these election results as
an anomaly, rejecting the possibility of Slovenian society being so politically secularized at
the time, Pleterski believes that such a decline in the support of political Catholicism was the
result of the social changes brought on by the First World War, which could not be simply
undone.
The renewed success of SLS in 1923 and 1927 parliamentary elections—with the
results of subsequent elections at the time of dictatorship (in 1931 and 1935) and “post51
52
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dictatorship” (1938) not being relevant in this sense—should be ascribed to the specific
circumstances in the kingdom, where with the so-called policy of autonomism,53 only the
SLS partly stood up to the centralist and unitary regime, while other two major political
parties in Slovenia—the liberals and the social democrats—supported Yugoslav unitarism.
Also, in 1920, the Communist Party was banned. Thus, regardless of the subsequent election
results, Slovenian society supposedly secularized, which may explain the division in the
Catholic camp in the 1930s and in other circumstances, the surprising growth of influence of
the handful of Communists54 who filled the vacuum on the left wing during the Second
World War, the only political party that had anticipated in good time, as early as the 1930s,
that the national question would be critical to the future of Slovenia.

Table 1: Religious composition in interwar Slovenia (Drava Banovina) according to the 1921
and 1931 Population Censuses
Catholics

Lutherans and

Christian

Reformed

Orthodox

Jews

Muslims

Greek

Old

No

Catholics

Catholic

religion

Church

1921

Other

Church

96.57%

2.59%

0.63%

0.09%

0.06%

0.05%

/

(122)

(17)

(1,018,771

(27,282)

(6,611)

(936)

(636)

(531)

96.76%

2.25%

0.59%

0.07%

0.08%

0.21%

0.009%

(257)

(190)

(1,107,155)

(25,717)

(6,745)

(820)

(927)

(2,377)

(102)

people)
1931

In this discussion about “religious idiosyncrasies,” about a somewhat different role of
the dominant church compared to other parts of Yugoslavia, and of the waning
confessionality of Slovenian society even before the Second World War, one cannot
disregard the extremely high number of the religiously affiliated Slovenians. Moreover,
almost 97 percent of a population of a good one million declared themselves as Catholics.
53
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Nor does this paper wish to deny in any way the monopoly of the Catholic Church in the
sphere of religion or its great power in politics; it is only calling into question the religious
uniformity of its members in this period and the reliability of certain data or their
interpretations.
The fact remains that it was socially unacceptable for most to be a nonbeliever at a
time when religious communities were still so heavily embedded in state structures—they
kept registers of births, marriages, and deaths, and religious education classes were
compulsory at school—although there existed the institution of civil marriage for (almost
non-existent) nonbelievers. In view of the high prevalence of one religious affiliation, a
similar potential social exclusion applied to non-Catholics—who were often equated with
foreigners—yet the commonness and, particularly, visibility of either increased in the
physical urban space (construction of new non-Catholic religious buildings) as well as in the
media and the arts (e.g., with Communist representatives of social realism).
Although in numerical terms, the religious composition in the Slovenian part of the
Kingdom of SHS did not change significantly until the end of the first Yugoslavia,55 there
emerged, especially in towns, in this rather conservative milieu, the germs of religious
diversification, which the mere statistical data do not reveal. In truth, Judaism and
Protestantism had been present in certain regions and in cities even before that. One of the
important “new” actors after the end of the First World War, however, was the Serbian
Orthodox Church, which soon after the unification of the country founded three Serbian
Orthodox parishes (in Ljubljana, Maribor and Celje) and erected the first Orthodox church
buildings in major Slovenian cities.56
Initially, the Orthodox congregation prevalently consisted of immigrants from other
parts of the country, but with time the number of Slovenian converts steadily increased. For
example, in 1938, the Celje parish counted as many as 242 Slovenians and three Germans57
among its 683 believers (the military, some 1,000 of them, are not included), and we can
safely claim that they were all converts (i.e., approximately one-third of all permanent
Orthodox residents), for there had been practically no Orthodox in this area before the First
World War. The Serbian Orthodox Church registered the highest increase in membership
Šircelj, 2003, pp. 69-71.
Before, the Serbian Orthodox Church had only been present in the so-called Uskoki villages in the area of the
Military Frontier (Slo. Vojna krajina), which belonged to Carniola, an Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy,
nowadays situated on the border with Croatia.
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among all religious communities and was able to also recruit people through the public media
and in national institutions, e.g., with pro-Orthodox articles (particularly in the Nova doba
[New Age] newspaper) and, indirectly, from the Sokol gymnastics organization, which in the
1930s, openly supported the “national religion.”
Also interesting were phenomena of “localized revolts” of entire villages or several
families against the Catholic Church or its representatives, which however, usually did not go
beyond threats with conversion to Orthodoxy.58 According to the first census, the number of
members of the Greek Catholic Church in 1931 stands out statistically, but the reason for that
lies in the slightly modified borders of the Drava Banovina, due to which its territory came to
incorporate the area of Žumberak inhabited by the descendants of Uskoks of Greek Catholic
faith. Old Catholicism, which was partly a cover for freemasonry and partly civil religion,
can also be considered as new religion in this area.59
The number of Muslims in this period was still minimal, but in a slightly upward
trend, and in 1931, the first imamate in Slovenian territories was founded in Ljubljana.
During the First World War, two mosques were also constructed for Muslim soldiers fighting
on the Isonzo Front (one in Log pod Mangartom and one supposedly on the mountain of
Rombon), the first two set in Slovenian territories, but soon after the end of the world
conflict, they had been torn down as they had lost their purpose. Religious diversity in
Slovenia was also enriched by the arrival of Russian emigrants60 seeking refuge in
Yugoslavia after the October Revolution, with whom many Slovenians shared opposition to
Communism. Recruitment into minority religions generated discontent and complaints from
the dominant religious organization and its members, not infrequently exacerbating its
relations with other religious communities, although at the same time there was some
initiative in it for an ecumenical movement, particularly in the sense of a moderate inclination
towards association with Orthodox churches.61
Among the issues that the Catholic Church considered pressing were religious
education in schools,62 the ban on the establishment of new religious schools, and the
influence that the Serbian Orthodox Church gained in schools nationwide, particularly
58
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through links with the Sokol gymnastics organization. Another important reason for the
dissatisfaction of the Catholic Church was the allocation of state funding to religious
communities, which did not only take into account the number of believers, but also ascribed
considerable weight to the “arbitrary” criterion of “truly proven needs” of a determinate
religious community, stated in the constitution of the Kingdom of SHS (1921) and in the
constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1931).
When compared by the number of members, the Old Catholic Church was the most
well-funded, but even the Serbian Orthodox Church was in a considerably better position
than the Catholic Church. Still, the Serbian Orthodox Church and, to a lesser extent, the Old
Catholic Church may have been spreading through the kingdom to territories where
previously they had had no adherents, but so was the Catholic Church, especially in
Macedonia (at the time called Southern Serbia) and Kosovo, with Slovenian priests playing
an influential role in the effort. Even the first bishop in Skopje, Janez Frančišek Gnidovec
(1924–1939), was a Slovenian. These regions, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, were
officially still under the authority of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide as
missionary territories.63
During the 1930s, the society in Slovenia was influenced by social, economic, and
political crises of divisions into anti-Communists and anti-Fascists, although some affiliated
with both groups.64 This same model can be used in the analysis of differentiation within the
Catholic camp itself.65 The Catholic right-wing as the official and most numerous group in
the Slovenian Catholic camp radicalized almost contemporaneously with its Western
European counterparts, which has been the subject of many historical studies.66
The process was accompanied by growing religious intolerance, most often amplified
by political and ethnic strife. At the same time, the Catholic Church in Slovenian regions was
faced with divisions within its own ranks, particularly with regard to views on democracy, the
63
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free market, and political pragmatism.67 Whereas the Catholic right-wing displayed a marked
“narrowing of views” (support of Catholic integralism, corporatism, anti-Communism,
antisocialism, non-democratic ideas and, to some extent, Fascism) and subjugation to church
structures (e.g., within Catholic Action), its antipode after espousing certain Marxist ideas,
the Catholic left (i.e., Christian socialists), exhibited greater autonomy among lay people in
relation to the Church. The Catholic center (i.e., Christian Democrats), who opposed the
abolition of parliamentarism and market economy and advocated the rights to private
property, was pushed to the sidelines.68
Religious minorities or religious communities with less sociopolitical influence,
although legally recognized, were also otherwise faced with numerous problems brought
about by “religious equality,” as they had difficulties “competing” with the majority and/or
most influential religion in the country.69 For example, the Senj-Modruš diocesan ordinariate
sent a warning to the then minister and leading Slovenian politician, Anton Korošec, about a
proselytical Baptists campaign spreading from Croatian regions to Bela Krajina in Slovenia.70
This was clearly a top-level communication. While all religious activities of Adventists and
Nazarenes were prohibited and were to be reported to state authorities as they were, due to
their pacifist beliefs, considered to be defying the laws of the country regarding military
service that were in the interest of the state.71

Religious Conversions in Slovenian Territory
Interreligious relations during the period of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia (1918–
1945) and even later were thus primarily determined by the relations between religious
communities and state authorities, by the politicization of religion (and vice versa, namely,
integration of religious contents into politics) and by the very history of religious
conversions: the mythization of conversions to Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic faiths
and to Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the rules of the Ottoman Empire and Austria67
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Hungary,72 the spread of Serbian Orthodoxy during the interwar period, and the forced
religious conversions of the Orthodox to the Catholic faith in the territories of the
Independent State of Croatia.73 At first glance, we could say that religious conversions in
Slovenian territories did not play as prominent a role in history as they did for Serbs,
Croatians and Bosniaks. However, if we expand our analysis of conversion processes to
include Christianization, Reformation and Counter-Reformation, as well as the perpetuation
of the image of a non-Catholic as a stereotypically negative religious and ethnic Other,
conversions suddenly appear of much greater import.
Most conversions during the interwar period in Slovenia indeed occurred in
connection with other ethnic communities and largely involved disaffiliation from the
Catholic Church. These were conversions from Catholicism into Lutheranism among the
German population, and conversions of Slovenes to the Serbian Orthodox Church motivated
by the perception of this religion as “Yugoslav,” although in practice, the converts to this
autocephalous church underwent some sort of Serbian “acculturation.” In conversions of
Slovenes to the Old Catholic Church, although some members would occasionally be
associated with adherents to the former Croatian Peasant Party, the ethnic affiliation was not
of the essence, which however, does not mean that the Catholic Church viewed these any
more favorably.
In studying religious conversion and broader interreligious relations in Slovenian
territories the scarcity of sources is a major problem, and even more so their dispersion. As
expected, most data refer to conversions to and disaffiliation from the Catholic Church, the
materials concerning Orthodox parishes are preserved in Celje and Ljubljana,74 while data
about the Evangelicals are available, mostly their parishes. Religious conversion and
disaffiliation trends are extremely difficult to analyze statistically, if at all, as even research in
centralized registers, such as those of the Ljubljana, Maribor, and Trieste-Koper dioceses, at
best yields information linked to the Catholic Church. Data can also be obtained from City
Hall archives and, in part, from archives of other religious communities, as converts were
required to notify the state authorities about their disaffiliation, and they usually provided
information on the faith they intended to join instead or if they wished to remain without
religion.
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Since non-Catholic religious communities often had an ethnic character, the religious
conversions themselves and the disputes they (could have) triggered transcended the
boundaries of the sphere of religiosity. These were typical cases of double minorities 75 and
processes of othering, not generated solely by the members of the original religion that a
convert abandoned, but also by members of the newly elected religious community in which
the convert was for a long time (sometimes forever) perceived as the “Other.” We know of
cases where even priests were not happy with certain converts. The main reason of their
displeasure was, of course, the large share of converts who changed their faith with the sole
purpose of obtaining a divorce, as many of them would afterwards not even attend religious
ceremonies.76 Such “circumvention” of the law and religious conversions for personal
(secular) benefits, which according to some estimates occurred in as many as 80 percent of
cases of conversions to Orthodoxy,77 also point at the changed appreciation of religion. Often
we come across comments made by people from Catholic circles that the “apostasy” of these
people from the Catholic Church was not a loss, as they never were good Catholics anyway
and would not make good Orthodox either [and the same applies to converts to other faiths].78
In another variant, the Serbian Orthodox rector in Celje asserted in his writings in 1936 that
the large number of Slovenes converting to the Serbian Orthodox Church were reluctant to
adopt Orthodox customs and remained Catholics “at heart.”79
We can conclude from this that a conversion to the Serbian Orthodox Church in a
predominantly Catholic environment represented a cultural shock and that converts were
excluded from certain segments of the society. For similar reasons, only a small number of
Slovenian converts chose to convert to Protestantism, as affiliation to Evangelical religious
communities (except in the northeastern part of the country, in Prekmurje, which had been
part of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy prior to the First World War) was
considered as “a refuge of the Germans.”80 An overview of statistical data shows that
conversions in Slovenian regions spiked in the first years following the First World War,
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77
Ilija Đ. Bulovan, Kronika Srbske pravoslavne parohije v Celju, napisana leta 1937 [A Chronicle of the
Serbian Orthodox Parish in Celje, written in 1937] (Celje: Zgodovinski arhiv; Beograd: Arhiv Srbije, 2010), p.
72.
78
Cf. Cvelfar, 2017, pp. 114, 118-119.
79
Bulovan, 2010, p. 72.
80
Cf. Boštjan Zajšek, “Nemški evangeličani na Slovenskem med obema vojnama [German Evangelicals in
interwar Slovenia]”, in Kronika, 59, 2011, 1:100.
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increasing again, though with less prominent highs, in the 1930s, particularly in 1937 and
1938. Given the highly predominant number of Catholics in Slovenia, disaffiliation from the
Catholic Church can tentatively also be assumed in cases of joining other faiths where the
converts’ original faith is not explicitly stated.
The membership of the Serbian Orthodox parish in Celje (Graph 1) registered the
largest gain during the royal dictatorship in 1929, while disaffiliation from it grew in the
years preceding the Second World War, a fact well perceived by the diocese of Ljubljana,
which at the time registered an increased number of cases of re-conversion,81 also spurred by
the change in political regime with the Yugoslav Radical Union coming to power. In
Slovenia, the “liberal” power was at the time replaced by a regime of which the “Catholic”
Slovene People’s Party was a constitutive part. Membership of the Serbian Orthodox parish
in Ljubljana saw completely different developments (Graph 1).
The first striking growth was recorded immediately upon the end of the First World
War, most probably due to the arrival of Russian emigrants and to the enthusiasm over the
unification into the Kingdom of SHS, in which the Serbian Orthodox Church was promoted
as the “national” religion. The numbers then constantly fluctuated, slightly declining in 1936
but instantly picking up a year after that, when the number of registered conversions reached
a high second only to that of 1921. A large share of the Orthodox population in Slovenia was
made up of soldiers and their families, certain officials, teachers and judges, immigrants from
Serbia. Among the most common reasons for conversion to Orthodoxy in Slovenia were
divorce in males, and marriage in females, occasionally including child legitimization (the
same applies to conversions to Islam).82
Another frequent reason was professional opportunism, particularly in military ranks,
but also among officials, often intertwining with the belief in a greater “patriotism” that the
affiliation to the Serbian Orthodox Church would allegedly ferment, as opposed to the
Catholic Church, which many believed in collusion with Mussolini. Interestingly, in the
Ljubljana parish the converts included more females than males, while in Celje, they were
gender-balanced.83 In trying to determine the causes for an increase of religious conversions,
Archiepiscopal Archives of Ljubljana (NŠAL), V, 100 Converts 1874-1938.
For more, see: Gašper Mithans, “Medverski odnosi in konvertiti na Slovenskem med svetovnima vojnama
[Interreligious relations and converts in interwar Slovenia],” in Stičišče religijskih svetov: družbeni in politični
vidiki ekumenizma na Slovenskem = Religious encounters: societal and political aspects of ecumenism in
Slovene lands, ed. Gašper Mithans (Koper: Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče Koper, Znanstvena založba
Annales, 2018), pp. 77-98.
83
Historical Archives of Celje (ZAC), SI ZAC-0995, Orthodox parish of St. Sava in Celje, no. 4, List of
Orthodox Households of the Serbian Orthodox Parish in Celje – Composition as of 31 December 1936; Cvelfar,
pp. 124-125.
81
82
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several social processes should be taken into consideration, such as laicization and
modernization, changed political borders, migration and minority policies, interreligious
contacts, unregulated legal matters spawning deviations in the religious sphere as well,
greater social differentiation, state policy favoring a determinate religion(s), and domestic
political conflicts.84

Graph 1: Conversions to the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ljubljana and Celje parishes
(1920–1940)85

Conversions to the Serbian Orthodox Church
in Ljubljana and Celje parishes
160

142

140
120
100
71

67

80

58

53 56

60

47

37

36

40
20

4

2

1

3

8

21

10

54

50
39
3

30 32
6

16 11

53

70
59

48 51

40 42
26

30 25 35

21

0

Ljubljana parish

41
20

13

3

Celje parish (no data before 1922)

The case of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (in this territory
called the German Evangelical Church) in Maribor is specific (Graph 2), registering a high
number of conversions after the First World War,86 a sort of second “Away from Rome!”
movement [Ger. Los-von-Röm]. This, however, was no longer limited to Catholicism or
84

Cf. with the 1928 document about conversions of Catholics to Serbian Orthodoxy, which states among the
reasons for conversion primarily the hope of being able to remarry in Orthodoxy (among legally divorced
Catholics) or the expectation to rise in rank in state or military service (among men), with the least number of
conversions supposedly prompted by “ideal” reasons, and even those not by religious, but “national” ones
(among the converts considering the Serbian Orthodox Church as a “national faith”) (Historical Archives of
Ljubljana (ZAL), LJU-489 The city of Ljubljana, f. 2012 the general city registry, p. 977).
85
Cvelfar, 2017, pp. 124-125; ZAC, SI ZAC-0995, Orthodox parish of St. Sava in Celje, no. 4, List of Orthodox
Households of the Serbian Orthodox Parish in Celje – Composition as of 31 December 1936.
86
The fond of the Evangelical parish of Maribor in the Maribor Regional Museum preserves 564 certifications
of disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church dating from 1918 to 1922 (Regional Archives of Maribor
(PAM), PAM-1821060/2 Evangelical parish of Maribor 1862-1945, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic
Church 1911-1918; PAM-1821060/3 Evangelical parish of Maribor 1862-1945, Disaffiliation from the Roman
Catholic Church 1919-1945; cf. Zajšek, 2011, p. 97).
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Protestantism, for dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church was in a way expressed by every
single case of disaffiliation from it, and most notably through the actions of the German
ethnic community, which indicated the emergence of national consolidation among the
remaining Germans in Slovenian regions. In fact, after disaffiliating from mainly, the
Catholic Church, they connected with fellow countrymen within the Evangelical parish.
Nevertheless, membership in the German Evangelical Church decreased as a result of
expulsion and voluntary migration of the members of German nationality; in the Evangelical
parish in Maribor, it dropped from around 1,800 in 1918 to 900 in 1925. The pressure on the
converts was considerable, with the police interrogating each and every one of them to
establish whether the conversion was politically motivated.87 The number of people joining
the German Evangelical Church rose slightly again before the Second World War from 1937
through 1941.88

Graph 2: Statistics on conversions to the German Evangelical parish in Maribor
(1918–1941)89
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Zajšek, 2011, pp. 98–100.
PAM-1821060/2 Evangelical parish of Maribor 1862-1945, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church
1911-1918; PAM-1821060/3 Evangelical parish of Maribor 1862-1945, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic
Church 1919-1945; cf. Zajšek, p. 97.
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PAM-1821060/3 Evangelical parish of Maribor 1862-1945, Disaffiliation from the Roman Catholic Church
1919-1945.
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Religious conversions for the Municipality of Ljubljana can also be reconstructed
based on the mandatory notifications of state authorities, the City Hall, about religious
disaffiliation.90 Predictably, this information is not entirely accurate, as people only related
their likely choice of religious (non)affiliation, and on a voluntary basis, nor is it comparable
with the data from the archives of the Serbian Orthodox parish in Ljubljana91 for example, as
the latter covered a much larger area; it can, nevertheless, suggest a certain trend. According
to the data from the Ljubljana City Hall, there were 549 cases of religious disaffiliation in the
Municipality of Ljubljana during the period of the Kingdom [we can, however, assume that
the number was higher than that], with a total of 221 women, 307 men and 21 children
leaving religious institutions (Graph 3). These were mostly cases of people leaving the
Catholic Church, which in Ljubljana throughout the period outnumbered those of people
joining it (Graph 4), with two years standing out: in 1921, there was a significant increase in
cases of disaffiliation without opting for another confession, which can be attributed in part to
the incidents that occurred during the railway strike in 1920, involving Slovenian
Communists, and the ban on the Communist Party proclaimed towards the end of that same
year. From the 52 cases of disaffiliation of that year, as many as 18 former Catholics
announced they would remain unattached to any religion. Many more cases of disaffiliation
were registered in 1937: no less than 147 of a total of 476 believers who left the Catholic
Church between 1918 and 1941.92 That year, the Old Catholics launched a very successful
proselytizing campaign after having founded their parish in Ljubljana in 1936. 1937 was also
the year when the so-called concordat crises reached its acme, bringing on severe discord
between the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church; such a dramatic increase in
religious conversions in the center of the Drava Banovina indicated that at least in
Ljubljana—called the liberal stronghold as early as the end of the 19th century—there was no
noticeable consolidation among the Catholics in support of the adoption of the concordat.

90

ZAL, LJU-489 The city of Ljubljana, f. 1801, f. 1939, f. 2012, f. 2098, f. 2107, f. 2114, f. 2121, f. 2131, f.
2143, f. 2232, f. 2233, f. 2282, f. 2298, f. 2315, f. 2361.
91
See document: ZAL, LJU-489 The city of Ljubljana, f. 2012, p. 977; Cvelfar, pp. 124-125.
92
ZAL, LJU 489, f. 1801, f. 1939, f. 2012, f. 2098, f. 2107, f. 2114, f. 2121, f. 2131, f. 2143, f. 2232, f. 2233, f.
2282, f. 2298, f. 2315, f. 2361.
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Graph 3: Statistics on disaffiliation in the Municipality of Ljubljana (1918–1941)93
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Graph 4: Statistics on conversions to and disaffiliation from the Catholic Church in the
Municipality of Ljubljana (1918–1941)94
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A comparison of statistical data with the annual registers of the Trieste-Koper diocese
(Graph 5)95 reveals a similar trend of rise, decline and renewed rise of conversions and

93

ZAL, LJU-489 The city of Ljubljana, f. 1801, f. 1939, f. 2012, f. 2098, f. 2107, f. 2114, f. 2121, f. 2131, f.
2143, f. 2232, f. 2233, f. 2282, f. 2298, f. 2315, f. 2361.
94
ZAL, LJU-489 The city of Ljubljana, f. 1801, f. 1939, f. 2012, f. 2098, f. 2107, f. 2114, f. 2121, f. 2131, f.
2143, f. 2232, f. 2233, f. 2282, f. 2298, f. 2315, f. 2361.
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disaffiliation during the interwar period. Particularly in 1937 and 1938, the number of people
joining the Catholic Church recorded a steep increase: 981 of a total of 1,520 converts
registered between 1918 and 1941,96 mostly Jews prompted by the adoption of the racial law.
The anti-Jewish policy pervaded the pre-war atmosphere throughout all of Europe, and in
Slovenia too, the Jewish population sought refuge in the Catholic Church. In the Parish of the
Annunciation in Ljubljana, for example, as many as 36 Jews converted to Catholicism during
the 1937–1941 period, compared to a mere 10 in the two previous decades.97

Graph 5: Statistics of conversions to and disaffiliation from the Catholic Church in the
Trieste-Koper diocese98
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In Slovenia, and in the countryside in particular, there was a small, but not negligible
number of converts during the period under study. The role they played within religious
minorities was particularly important, as they represented a significant share of the religious
community both among the Serbian Orthodox and German Lutherans, which despite an

95

The otherwise multinational Trieste-Koper diocese included part of the Slovenian ethnic territory that was
incorporated into Italy after 1920.
96
Episcopal Archives of Trieste (ADT), Diocesan Registry, 1918-1941.
97
Archive of the parish of the Lady Day Church in Ljubljana, Book of converts.
98
ADT, Diocesan Registry, 1918-1941.
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increase in religious conversions at the time, registered a decline due to considerable
expatriation, either voluntary or forced, of its members.99
Further, the manner in which the converts were integrated into the new religious
community (if at all) and the permanence of their decision could also be in contrast with their
expectations in view of the reason for their conversion. A person who at first intended to
convert in order to advance professionally could later develop genuine religious feelings
towards the religion to which they converted, becoming profoundly religious. Or the initial
enthusiasm over the newly adopted religion could give way to disillusionment. Many
Slovenians complained, for example, that the Serbian Orthodox Church spoke exclusively
Serbian and used the Cyrillic alphabet, the Brotherhood of Orthodox Slovenians even
demanding that the Slovenian language and the Latin alphabet be introduced into Orthodox
liturgy in Slovenia and a Slovenian Orthodox Church be established.100

Conclusion
The phenomenon of religious conversion as one of the most fundamental factors of
pluralistic religious society and often the basis of exclusivist national mythologies in the
southern European region is largely unexplored, both theoretically and empirically,101 and
particularly in relation to periods before the Second World War, which remain uncovered
even by sociology, ethnology, and anthropology.
In contemporary Slovenian history102 this topic is unexplored, mainly because of the
low number of converts. This area, during the interwar period, was prevalently (originally)
inhabited by Catholics, which is to be expected given the overall predominance of
Catholicism and the slow religious diversification. Many of the converts were either of nonSlovenian nationality or they converted into religious communities that spread to Slovenia
from other countries or other parts of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia and preserved their

Zajšek, 2011, p. 99-100; Mithans, “Medverski odnosi,” 2018, pp. 84-85.
See: Bulovan, 2010, p. 72; Cvelfar, 2017, pp. 100-101.
101
Konverzija i kontekst. Teorijski, metodološki i praktični pristupi religijskoj konverziji [Conversion and
context. Theoretical, methodological and practical approaches to religious conversion], ed. Zorica Kuburić,
Srđan Sremac (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2009); cf. Historische Anthropologie im südöstlichen Europa: Eine Einführung
[Historical anthropology in Southeastern Europe: An introduction] ed. Karl Kaser et al. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003);
Ponovno iscrtavanje granica: transformacije identiteta i redefiniranje kulturnih regija u novim političkim
okolnostima/Ponovno izrisovanje meja: transformacije identitet in redefiniranje kulturnih regij v novih
političnih okoliščinah [Redrawing borders: identity transformations and redefining cultural regions in new
political circumstances], ed. Marijana Belaj et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatsko etnološko društvo; Ljubljana: Slovensko
etnološko društvo, 2014).
102
With a few exceptions: Cvirn, 2005; Cvelfar, 2017; Mithans, “Medverski odnosi,” 2018; Maver, 2014;
Zajšek, 2011.
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ethnic character. This made adapting to a new religious environment difficult and
exacerbated the “stigma” of converts. The increase in conversions out of protest, for political
reasons, and personal gain, and the conflicting relations between the two major churches in
the state did not help towards a greater social acceptance of this phenomenon. The latter does
indicate a growing perception of religious affiliation as a choice, which not even a strong
religious socialization could suppress. On the other hand, the Serbian Orthodox Church, for
example, despite its active proselytism, was not entirely prepared for the arrival of Slovenian
converts, some of whom were upset by the exclusive use of the Serbian language and the
Cyrillic alphabet within the religious community and its activities. Undoubtedly though,
religious conversions also influenced the heterogenization of identification with and
perception of Catholicism.
Due to the marginality of (non-Catholic) religious Others as well as the importance of
Protestant writers for the development of the Slovenian standard language and literary
culture, the dominant religious institution in the Slovenian environment is reflected as having
a less central role compared to other Yugoslav nationalities even before the Second World
War and the period of the socialist regime, which triggered the process of greater
secularization and religious pluralization. But we could hardly speak of an individualistic
type of religion in Slovenian territory before independence in 1991,103 although certain socioreligious specifics did exist, mainly due to a different state structure prior to the First World
War, the circumstances of the so-called cultural nationalism and thereby the experience of
other historical processes. The interwar period in particular was crucial for the later religious
diversification, with urban space, culture, politics, and the media slowly opening to religious
plurality and secularism, even though that frequently generated tension and intolerance.

At present, there are 54 religious communities registered in Slovenia (see: Nadja Furlan Štante, “Ženski
glasovi in akcije v medreligijskem dialogu in religijski izgradnji miru v slovenskem kontekstu” [Women’s
Voices and Actions in Interreligious Dialogue and Religious Peacebuilding in the Slovenian Context], in
Poligrafi, 24, 2019, 95/96: 26). Interestingly, Slovenia is one of the most secularized countries that we know if
we consider the criteria of religious education in public schools, the legal status of abortion and regulation of
proselytism. Only six other countries in the world, besides Slovenia, have none of these policies: Cape Verde,
Montenegro, North Korea, South Africa, Taiwan, and the United States [the abortion is legal, however with
restrictions in several states], see: Jonathan Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 198.
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List of abbreviations
ADT = Archivio diocesano di Trieste/Episcopal Archives of Trieste, Italy
AJ = Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia
NŠAL = Nadškofijski arhiv Ljubljana/Archiepiscopal Archives of Ljubljana, Slovenia
PAM = Pokrajinski arhiv Maribor/Regional Archives of Maribor, Slovenia
ZAC = Zgodovinski arhiv Celje/Historical Archives Celje, Slovenia
ZAL = Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana/Historical Archives Ljubljana, Slovenia
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